Pilot Debrief

BEECH D35 near Sevierville, TN — 2016-05-19

Final reportERA16FA188
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Date
2016-05-19
Location
Sevierville, TN, USA
Airport
GKT
Aircraft
BEECH D35
Registration
N2967B
Category
Airplane
Highest injury
Fatal
Fatalities
1
Phase of flight
Approach

Probable cause

The pilot's failure to properly configure the landing gear and the pilot's inappropriate decision to abort the landing after the propeller had contacted the runway, which resulted in a loss of thrust and a subsequent loss of control of the airplane.

NTSB narrative

After takeoff on a personal flight, the private pilot of the complex, high performance airplane flew around the local area for about 30 minutes before returning to the airport to land. According to security camera video, witnesses, and physical evidence, the airplane touched down with the wing flaps down and the landing gear in the up (retracted) position. The propeller struck the ground multiple times as the airplane skidded along the ground on its belly. The pilot increased engine power, and the airplane lifted off. The airplane climbed slowly to a point about 450 feet beyond the departure end of the runway and then pitched up, rolled to the left, and impacted terrain. The pitch up and left roll were consistent with a loss of control due to the pilot exceeding the airplane's critical angle of attack and encountering an aerodynamic stall. Postaccident examination of the landing gear system revealed that the landing gear doors were closed; all three landing gear were in their retracted positions in the gear wells; the emergency gear extension handle was stowed; and the push-pull rods from the gearbox to the "A" frame assemblies at the wheels were retracted. These findings indicated that the pilot had retracted the landing gear after takeoff and failed to extend the landing gear before landing. Examination of the propeller also revealed that it sustained significant impact damage from contacting the runway, which likely affected its aerodynamic performance and resulted in a loss of thrust during the pilot's aborted landing and attempted climb. Although the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires that each pilot acting as pilot-in-command of an airplane must complete a flight review every 24 months to assess that pilot's flying skills, review of the pilot's logbooks revealed that his last flight review had occurred more than 10 years before the accident. Review of the pilot's logbook also indicated that the pilot had received 3.1 hours of flight instruction in the accident airplane about 1 year before the accident, but there was no record of the complex and high-performance endorsements required by the FAA to act as pilot-in-command of the airplane. During the examination of the wreckage, the remains of a Pilot's Operating Handbook and Airplane Flight Manual (POH/AFM) was found behind the pilot's and copilot's seats in the cabin, an area that was out of reach from the pilot's position. The POH/AFM contained a Before Landing Checklist that directed the pilot to extend the landing gear and check that it was down before landing. No checklists were found near the pilot's seat.

Analysis

Primary failure mode
Human factors
First missed decision gate
Pilot failed to confirm landing gear was down before landing attempt.

NTSB coding

Evidence available

  • Video
  • Photos
  • 13 docket documents
View NTSB final reportView NTSB docket

Docket documents13

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