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Study Path

Continuing an Unstable Approach

When fixing the approach feels easier than going around

Overview

This Study Path is about the approach that stops being stable and the pilot who continues anyway. The failure is not the unstable approach itself. The failure is the decision to continue through it when a go-around was still available. The pattern is built on the gap between recognizing that the approach is not working and acting on that recognition. This path trains the ability to see when an approach has left the recoverable window, and to understand why pilots keep trying to fix what should be abandoned.

Real-World Scenario

An airline transport pilot was flying a twin-engine airplane on a cross-country flight at night with six passengers on board. The destination weather was well below standard visual conditions, with a low overcast ceiling, reduced visibility, rain, and fog. The pilot requested and was cleared for the ILS approach to the active runway. During the approach, the airplane's glideslope indicator displayed an invalid signal. The pilot continued inbound without vertical guidance, tracking the localizer alone. The lateral course wandered — corrections were made on both sides of centerline, but the airplane never stabilized on a clean track. The airplane descended below the expected profile. As it neared the runway environment, still offset from centerline, the pilot initiated a turn away from the approach course. The turn was not consistent with the published missed approach. The airplane was now flying away from the airport, at low altitude, in weather that offered no outside visual references.

Lessons

Recognizing InstabilityWhen the approach is telling you how it will end
1

An unstable approach is a prediction, not just a snapshot

An approach that is high, fast, or misaligned at the point where it should be stable is not going to fix itself. It is predicting what the next thirty seconds will look like: large corrections, rising workload, narrowing margins, and a touchdown that will not be on speed or on point. Pilots often treat the unstable approach as a temporary condition that will resolve. But the energy state and geometry at that point have inertia. The airplane does not suddenly become stable because the pilot wants it to. The approach is telling the pilot what the landing will be.

2

Continuing is not neutral. It removes the go-around option

Every second a pilot continues an unstable approach, the go-around becomes more expensive and eventually unavailable. At altitude and airspeed, a go-around is a simple maneuver. Close to the ground, slow, with high drag configuration and gusty conditions, a go-around becomes a high-workload transition that the pilot may not execute cleanly. The decision to continue is not preserving the plan. It is trading the safest available option for a progressively riskier one. Pilots who delay the go-around often end up in a position where they cannot go around and cannot land safely either.

The Outcome

This is where the option space collapses.

This is where the option space collapses. The airplane moved away from the approach course into weather that offered no outside references. Pitch control became erratic. The airplane was loaded beyond its aft balance limit, and each correction demanded more effort than the one before. The pilot had been awake for an extended period, and the cumulative workload of the preceding minutes had been building without relief. The airplane stopped flying. It struck terrain east of the airport. All seven occupants were fatally injured. Both engines were producing power at impact.

Reflection Prompts

Use these prompts to rehearse the decision points before you ever face them in flight.

  • When an approach stops matching what you expected, how long does it take before you stop treating the mismatch as something temporary?
  • If one source of guidance disappears partway through an approach, how do you notice the moment your workload shifts from manageable to accumulating?
  • When corrections come faster and the result keeps drifting, what does it feel like just before you realize the trend is not reversing?
  • If you are fatigued, in weather you cannot see through, and the approach is deteriorating, how confident are you that you would recognize all three at the same time?
  • What does it feel like when you are no longer flying the approach you briefed but have not yet named what you are doing instead?

After your next approach that does not feel right, capture what you saw, what you did, and where your go-around gate was in Debrief.

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Real-World Reference

This study path is anchored to a real NTSB investigation: CESSNA 414A (2015).

Primary AccidentCessna 414A — Night IMC, loss of control during unstable instrument approach, Bloomington IL (2015)
Similar Mishaps
  • BEECH 95 B55 (T42A) (2016)
  • Socata TBM 700 (2019)
  • PIPER PA46 (2023)
  • GATES LEARJET CORPORATION 35A (2021)
  • PIPER PA 46-310P (2017)

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Pilot Debrief presents aviation mishap information derived from official National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) data. Content is provided for educational and safety purposes only. It does not replace official reports or professional judgment.

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Amplified CostWhen wind turns a bad approach into a worse one
3

Crosswind and gusts amplify the cost of being unstable

A gusty crosswind does not create an unstable approach by itself, but it makes an already unstable approach much harder to recover. The pilot must manage drift correction, bank angle, and airspeed simultaneously while the wind changes magnitude and direction. If the approach is already behind, the crosswind demands attention that the pilot does not have available. This is why crosswind landing accidents often involve approaches that were unstable before the crosswind became the problem. The wind did not cause the accident. The unstable approach removed the margin the wind required.

Where on final did the go-around option quietly disappear?
Last Signal, Late DecisionWhen the flare becomes the decision point
4

The bounce or balloon is the last signal before loss of control

When a pilot arrives at the runway too fast, too high, or misaligned, the touchdown is rarely clean. The airplane bounces, balloons, or touches down in a crab. Each of these is a final signal that the approach was not stable and the landing will not be either. Pilots who try to save the landing after a bounce or balloon are adding energy and uncertainty at the worst possible moment. The correct response is a go-around, but by this point the pilot has already committed psychologically to landing. The bounce is where decision inertia becomes most dangerous.

5

The go-around decision belongs before final, not at the threshold

The decision to go around should be made at the point where the pilot recognizes the approach is not converging on a stable state. That point is usually on short final, well before the runway. If the pilot waits until the flare or touchdown to decide, the go-around becomes a recovery maneuver rather than a planned transition. Pilots who set a personal gate for go-around decisions before the approach begins tend to act earlier and more decisively. The gate does not need to be a specific altitude. It needs to be a clear criterion: if the approach does not look right by a defined point, the pilot goes around without further evaluation.