Pilot Debrief

HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORP HAWKER 900XP near Telluride, CO — 2024-07-20

Final reportCEN24LA328
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Date
2024-07-20
Location
Telluride, CO, USA
Airport
TEX
Aircraft
HAWKER BEECHCRAFT CORP HAWKER 900XP
Registration
N526FC
Category
Airplane
Highest injury
None
Fatalities
0

Probable cause

The flight crew’s failure to properly configure the airplane for takeoff in a high-density altitude environment, which resulted in a loss of control and a subsequent runway excursion. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew’s failure to use checklists.

Contributing factors

Contributing to the accident was the flight crew’s failure to use checklists.

NTSB narrative

The airplane landed at the high-elevation airport and the passengers disembarked. For the subsequent departure on the 7,111 ft-long runway, the pilot calculated that a takeoff roll of 6,800–6,900 ft would be needed with the wing flaps extended to 15°. The copilot was flying the airplane during the takeoff. During the departure takeoff roll on the dry asphalt, the airplane did not attain 75% of the planned takeoff speed about halfway down the runway, so the copilot decided to abort the takeoff. The brakes, air brakes, and thrust reversers were used to slow the airplane; however, the airplane did not slow down. Maximum braking was then applied, and the airplane began to depart from the runway to the right. The airplane traveled over the engineered material arresting system (EMAS) and came to rest upright. After exiting the airplane, the pilot saw the wing flaps were fully retracted and were not extended to 15°. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the lower fuselage. A review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data found that during the startup, taxi, and attempted takeoff from runway 27, there was no discussion of checklist usage or configuration settings for the airplane. A review of the airplane flight manual (AFM) found two checklists where the flight crew sets and confirms the flap position before takeoff. Postaccident examination of the airframe confirmed flight control continuity. The flap handle and the flap mechanical indicator on the pedestal were found in the fully up position (0°). Both engines were found to be operating and responding to power lever inputs throughout the takeoff roll and the accident sequence. Airframe to engine control continuity for both engines was established. At the time of the accident, the estimated density altitude for the airport was 11,244 ft msl. A review of video footage from an automated weather observing system (AWOS) camera facing east showed an extended windsock with an east wind during the takeoff and subsequent aborted takeoff. The wind was from 120° at 12 kts, with gusts to 17 kts, which exceeded the airplane’s maximum tailwind component for takeoff. According to the FAA-approved AFM, for a field pressure altitude of 9,000 ft, a takeoff weight of 24,000–25,000 lbs, and an outside air temperature of 20°C, the runway length needed for takeoff would have been 6,448–7,035 ft with 15° flaps. For a field pressure altitude of 9,000 ft, a takeoff weight of 24,000–25,000 lbs, and an outside air temperature of 20°C, the runway length needed for takeoff would have been 7,912–9,308 ft with 0° flaps. Based on the available evidence, it is likely that the flight crew did not properly configure the airplane for the takeoff in the high-density altitude environment, as the flaps were found at 0° instead of 15°. Additionally, the flight crew attempted to take off with a tailwind that exceeded an operational limitation for the airplane. If the flight crew had used their checklists, the flaps would have been appropriately set during the before takeoff checks and the lineup checks.

NTSB coding

Evidence available

  • CVR
  • Video
  • ADS-B / radar
  • Photos
  • 40 docket documents
View NTSB final reportView NTSB docket

Docket documents40

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