Pilot Debrief

CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22 near LaFayette, GA — 2025-03-20

Final reportERA25FA151
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Date
2025-03-20
Location
LaFayette, GA, USA
Airport
9A5
Aircraft
CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22
Registration
N969SS
Category
Airplane
Highest injury
Fatal
Fatalities
2
Phase of flight
Approach

Probable cause

The pilot’s exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack while landing and the flight instructor’s inadequate remedial action, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin at an altitude too low for recovery.

NTSB narrative

The reported purpose of the flight was because the pilot receiving instruction and his flight instructor both had a free day to go flying. The flight logbook of the pilot receiving instruction showed that he had been receiving instruction toward his commercial pilot certificate from the flight instructor. After picking up the flight instructor the pilot took off and completed two circuits in the airport traffic pattern. Both landing approaches during these circuits were consistent with a power-off 180° accuracy approach and landing. The third circuit was consistent with the previous two approaches. During the third approach, as the airplane neared the ground, data recovered from avionics onboard the airplane showed that the airplane’s pitch began to increase while the airplane was in a steep left bank. Simultaneously, the airspeed began to decrease below the stall speed listed in the airplane Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH). The airplane then suddenly rolled right, and the pitch decreased. The airplane impacted the ground before the runway threshold in the displaced threshold area and was heavily damaged by postimpact fire. Postaccident examination of the wreckage found no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation. The power-off 180° accuracy approach and landing was a maneuver that was required to be demonstrated in order to obtain a commercial pilot certificate. This maneuver involved reducing engine power to idle while on the downwind leg of the traffic pattern and attempting to land on or just beyond a preselected point on the runway. Performance of this maneuver required the pilot to assess the risks associated with wind, airplane performance, and low-altitude maneuvering, to include stalls or spins. One of the common errors associated with this maneuver was a pilot’s attempt to “stretch” a glide during an undershot approach. Given the airplane’s observed pitch, bank, and airspeed during the final moments of the accident flight, it is likely that, during the power-off 180° accuracy approach and landing maneuver attempt, the pilot receiving instruction misjudged the landing, which resulted in an undershot approach. He then likely attempted to stretch the glide, which resulted in the airplane exceeding the critical angle of attack and entering an aerodynamic stall/spin at an altitude too low to successfully recover. Additionally, the flight instructor should have been able to recognize the airplane’s attitude and airspeed as the airplane approached the low altitude aerodynamic stall and been able to intervene in sufficient time to prevent it. Although there was no clear evidence that the pilot receiving instruction was impaired by effects of diabetes or its treatment at the time of the accident, the pilot receiving instruction had also used prescription medications, including clomiphene and chloroquine, that were not reported at his last aviation medical examination, and that, while not typically impairing, could have had adverse side effects. In addition, the pilot receiving instruction had cardiovascular conditions, including moderate coronary artery disease, high blood pressure, and diabetes, that were associated with increased risk of an impairing or incapacitating cardiovascular event, such as arrythmia, heart attack, or stroke. Although there is no autopsy evidence that such an event occurred, such an event cannot be excluded by autopsy evidence alone. The flight instructor’s abnormally elevated carboxyhemoglobin level can be attributed to effects of the postimpact fire. In-flight carbon monoxide poisoning was unlikely given the fact that the pilot receiving instruction did not have elevated carboxyhemoglobin.

Analysis

Primary failure mode
Loss of control
First missed decision gate
Instructor could have aborted the approach when the airplane was in a nose-high attitude.

NTSB coding

Evidence available

  • Video
  • ADS-B / radar
  • 22 docket documents
View NTSB final reportView NTSB docket

Docket documents22

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