Pilot Debrief

BOEING 737 near Charleston, WV — 2009-07-13

Final reportDCA09FA065
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Date
2009-07-13
Location
Charleston, WV, USA
Airport
CRW
Aircraft
BOEING 737
Registration
N387SW
Category
Airplane
Highest injury
None
Fatalities
0
Phase of flight
Cruise

Probable cause

Fuselage skin failure due to preexisting fatigue at a chemically milled step.

NTSB narrative

Flight data recorder data revealed that the airplane took off and climbed for about 25 minutes to an altitude of approximately 35,000 feet, at which point the cabin altitude warning activated, and the captain disengaged the autopilot. Postincident examination of the airplane revealed fatigue cracking of the fuselage skin near the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer adjacent to the rupture. The fatigue cracking penetrated the fuselage skin and created an approximate 18-inch by 12-inch flap in the skin that depressurized the airplane. The fuselage skin assembly near the leading edge of the vertical stabilizer was manufactured by bonding two full aluminum sheets together, then selectively chemically milling away pockets (bays) of the inner sheet. Continuous fatigue cracks initiated from multiple origins on the inner surface of the skin adjacent to the step formed at the edge of the chemically milled area and propagated outward. Following the Southwest Airlines (SWA) flight 2294 event, on September 3, 2009, Boeing issued Service Bulletin (SB) 737-53A1301, calling for repetitive external inspections to detect cracks in the fuselage skin along the chemically milled step at stringers S-1 and S-2 right and between BS 827 and BS 847. (The hole from the SWA event was within those boundaries.) If cracks are detected, operators are to contact Boeing for repair instructions. On January 12, 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration issued Airworthiness Directive 2010-01-09, which mandated the inspection requirements in SB 737-53A1301.

Analysis

Primary failure mode
Mechanical failure
First missed decision gate
Inspection of fuselage skin near vertical stabilizer could have prevented failure.

NTSB coding

Evidence available

  • FDR / data
  • 21 docket documents
View NTSB final reportView NTSB docket

Docket documents21

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