Pilot Debrief

Apollo AS-III near Poipu, HI — 2010-12-22

Final reportWPR11LA081
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Date
2010-12-22
Location
Poipu, HI, USA
Airport
PAK
Aircraft
Apollo AS-III
Registration
N157AP
Category
Trike
Highest injury
None
Fatalities
0
Phase of flight
Cruise

Probable cause

The pilot's lack of compliance with manufacturer's guidance for care and handling of the aircraft combined with incomplete preflight inspections, which resulted in an undetected material failure of the nose cone.

NTSB narrative

The special light sport weight-shift control aircraft, commonly referred to as a "trike," took off from its base on the island of Kauai, Hawaii, on a "discovery" flight. On board were the instructor-rated pilot and the passenger-student. According to the pilot, while in cruise flight about 45 minutes after takeoff, the aircraft became "extremely difficult" to control, and the fabric wing skin was "fluttering intensely" along its trailing edge. The pilot opted for a precautionary landing on a nearby golf course. During the landing roll, the aircraft tipped onto one wing. Postlanding examination of the aircraft revealed that the fabric nose cone that was installed over the centerline juncture of the two wing leading edge tubes was damaged. The purpose of the nose cone was to prevent ram air from entering and inflating the wings during flight, which would change the wing profiles and result in controllability problems. The aircraft manufacturer indicated that the nose cone damage was primarily due to the nose cone being left in place when the wings were folded for transport or storage, a practice which was strongly discouraged by the manufacturer. In addition, although the manufacturer recommended against unprotected storage of the aircraft to preclude fabric deterioration from the elements, the pilot was known to store the aircraft outside on a regular basis. In combination, those practices by the pilot, which were contrary to the manufacturer's guidance, resulted in the degradation and eventual failure of the nose cone. With the aircraft on its wheels, the nose cone and upper surface of the wing were at least 8 feet above the ground, but there was no evidence that the operator or the accident pilot had or utilized a stepladder or other means to access and inspect the nose cone and wing upper surface before flight. The lack of equipment to conduct a thorough preflight inspection prevented timely detection of the deterioration of the nose cone.

Analysis

Primary failure mode
Mechanical failure
First missed decision gate
Pilot could have opted for an immediate landing instead of continuing to cruise.

NTSB coding

Evidence available

  • 12 docket documents
View NTSB final reportView NTSB docket

Docket documents12

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