BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10 near Washington, DC — 2025-01-30
- Date
- 2025-01-30
- Location
- Washington, DC, USA
- Aircraft
- BOMBARDIER INC CL-600-2C10
- Registration
- N709PS
- Category
- Airplane
- Highest injury
- Fatal
- Fatalities
- 67
Probable cause
The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA); as well as the air traffic system’s overreliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept. Also causal was the lack of effective pilot-applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a midair collision. Additional causal factors were the tower team’s loss of situation awareness and degraded performance due to the high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real-time operational risk factors, which resulted in misprioritization of duties, inadequate traffic advisories, and the lack of safety alerts to both flight crews. Also causal was the Army’s failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of error tolerances on barometric altimeters in their helicopters, which resulted in the crew flying above the maximum published helicopter route altitude. Contributing factors include: · the limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crews; · an unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix, and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strained the DCA air traffic control tower workforce and degraded safety over time; · the Army’s lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, DC, helicopter routes; · the FAA’s failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast In, and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational changes based on previously identified risks that were known to management; and · the absence of effective data sharing and analysis among the FAA, aircraft operators, and other relevant organizations.
NTSB narrative
On January 29, 2025, about 2048 eastern standard time, a Sikorsky UH 60L, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25 (Priority Air Transport Flight 25), and an MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), N709PS, operated by PSA Airlines as American Airlines flight 5342, collided in flight about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers on board the airplane and all 3 crewmembers on board the helicopter died. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident. Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport, Wichita, Kansas, to DCA. PAT25 originated from Davison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the purpose of the pilot’s annual standardization evaluation flight with the use of night vision goggles. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the time of the accident.
NTSB coding
Evidence available
- CVR
- ATC audio
- Video
- FDR / data
- ADS-B / radar
- 208 docket documents
Docket documentsshowing 50 of 208
- 17-S FAA ORDER JO 7210.633A_CHG_1 AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION (ATO) QUALITY ASSURANCEatc
- 17-T FAA ORDER JO 8020.16E AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND AIRCRAFT INCIDENT NOTIFICATION, INVESTIGATION, AND REPORTINGatc
- 17-U FAA ORDER JO_7210.634A_CHG_1 AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION (ATO) QUALITY CONTROLatc
- 2-AIR-S MID-AIR COLLISION RISK AND AREAS OF HIGH BENEFIT FOR TRAFFIC ALERTINGatc
- 22-A DCA AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER COMMUNICATIONS FACTUAL REPORTatc
- 3-A - ATC-HP - GROUP CHAIRMANS FACTUAL REPORTatc
- 3-AA - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 26 - DCA ATCT FACILITY LOGS AND RECORDSatc
- 3-B - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 1 - ATC AUDIO RECORDINGSatc
- 3-BB - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 27 - DOT ORDER 3910.1D - DOT DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING GUIDEatc
- 3-C - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 2 - FAA AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT PACKAGEatc
- 3-CC - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 28 - GAO STUDY - AIRCRAFT NOISE - 2021atc
- 3-D - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 3 - DCA APPROACH PROCEDURESatc
- 3-DD - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 29 - DCA ATCT SRMP WORKBOOK - FEB-MAR 2023atc
- 3-E - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 4 - ADS-B DATAatc
- 3-EE - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 30 - FAA ORDER JO 7210.3DD, FACILITY OPERATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIONatc
- 3-F - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 5 - STARS RADAR DATAatc
- 3-FF - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 31 - DCA AIRPORT ARRIVAL RATE INFORMATIONatc
- 3-FFF - DCA ATCT ICV MITIGATIONS OCT 2014-JUL 2025atc
- 3-G - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 6 - PDARS STUDIESatc
- 3-GG - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 32 - MIT SYSIR - JANUARY 30, 2025atc
- 3-GGG - DCA ATCT ECV MITIGATIONS SEP 2014-JUL 2025atc
- 3-H - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 7 - DCA ATCT LETTERS OF AGREEMENTatc
- 3-HH - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 33 - MIT SYSIR - JANUARY 30, 2025 - DATAatc
- 3-I - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 8 - MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD - AJV-A2atc
- 3-II - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 34 - FAA AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION MANUAL (AIM)atc
- 3-J - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 9 - DCA ATCT WORKSTATION DOCUMENTATION (HP)atc
- 3-JJ - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 35 - FAA MEMO - EXPANDING SLOTS AT DCAatc
- 3-JJJ - DCA ATCT OVERTIME USAGE - JAN 2024-JAN 2025atc
- 3-K - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 10 - DCA ATCT STAFFING DOCUMENTATION REDACTEDatc
- 3-KK - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 36 - TIME BASED FLOW MANAGEMENT (TBFM) INFORMATIONatc
- 3-L - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 11 - DCA ATCT SOP - MULTIPLE VERSIONS AND NOTICESatc
- 3-LL - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 37 - FAA ORDER JO 7110.65AA - AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLatc
- 3-LLL - DCA ATCT TO TEDC OJTI WEEKLY REPORTS - JUL 2024-JAN 2025atc
- 3-M - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 12 - DCA ATCT TOP DATAatc
- 3-MM - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 38 - FAA ORDER JO 7210.632A - AIR TRAFFIC ORGANIZATION OCCURRENCE REPORTINGatc
- 3-N - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 13 - INDIVIDUAL TRAINING AND PROFICIENCY RECORDSatc
- 3-NN - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 39 - DCA HELICOPTER WORKING GROUP DOCUMENTSatc
- 3-O - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 14 - FAA ORDER JO 3120.4S A�� AIR TRAFFIC TECHNICAL TRAININGatc
- 3-OO - ALLENDOERFER FRIEDMAN-BERG PAI 2007 - ATC SAFETY ALERTSatc
- 3-OOO - 14 CFR PART 93 SUBPART K - HIGH DENSITY TRAFFIC AIRPORTSatc
- 3-P - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 15 - DCA ATCT 3120.4J - DCA ATCT FACILITY TRAININGatc
- 3-PP - NEWMAN ALLENDOERFER 2000 - ATC AUDIBLE ALERTSatc
- 3-Q - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 16 - AIR TRAFFIC NATIONAL TRAINING INITIATIVE - JANUARY 2025atc
- 3-R - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 17 - DCA ATCT 2024 REFRESHER TRAINING PLANatc
- 3-RRR - DCA ATCT QCG ECV FINDINGS MEMO - 2020-2024atc
- 3-S - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 18 - DCA ATCT PERTINENT TRAINING INFORMATIONatc
- 3-SSS - DCA ATCT QCG ECV NOTIFICATION MEMO - 2022-2024atc
- 3-T - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 19 - FAA ORDER 1100.161B - AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY OVERSIGHTatc
- 3-U - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 20 - FAA ORDER JO 1000.37C - ATO SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMatc
- 3-V - ATC-HP - ATTACHMENT 21 - FAA ORDER JO 7200.20B - VOLUNTARY SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAMatc
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