Pilot Debrief

COMPAGNIE DAHER TBM 700 near Ashland, OR — 2023-04-07

Final reportWPR23LA150
Sign in to save
Date
2023-04-07
Location
Ashland, OR, USA
Airport
S03
Aircraft
COMPAGNIE DAHER TBM 700
Registration
N6924G
Category
Airplane
Highest injury
None
Fatalities
0
Phase of flight
Approach

Probable cause

The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate airspeed during an attempted go around, which resulted in a runway excursion and impact with terrain.

NTSB narrative

The pilot reported he was 2.5 hours into a flight review when the accident occurred. On the last leg of the trip the flight the instructor simulated a runway closure and a diversion to a nearby airport. The pilot verified the favored runway and entered an extended downwind to set up a stable approach. The pilot configured the airplane per the airplane checklist and set his power setting for a torque greater than 10 percent to maintain an airspeed of 80-95 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). When crossing the runway threshold, the instructor stated there was a simulated obstruction on the runway and instructed the pilot to go around. As the pilot advanced the power, the airplane yawed to the left of the runway centerline. The pilot remembers adding right rudder pressure with no effect. The airplane touched down on the left side of the runway and then departed the runway. The airplane traveled through bushes and scrub trees before coming to rest at the edge of a creek. The pilot and instructor secured the airplane and exited before a small fire engulfed much of the airplane. Although the pilot and instructor did not recall any indication of impending loss of control or an aural stall warning before touchdown, audio recorded from onboard the airplane revealed that during the accident approach an electronic voice called out “Stall. Stall.” three times when the airplane was below 500 ft above ground level (agl), followed by “Airspeed” just before touchdown. During and after touchdown, “Stall. Stall.” sounded four additional times as the airplane decelerated. Recordings from the previous leg also contained stall and airspeed electronic voice call outs before landing. The first-leg landing did not include a go-around. Telemetry data recovered showed airspeeds below the required 80 KIAS during the go around attempt. Airplane data showed that on the last two final approaches the airspeed was below 80 KIAS which is required for a go-around at time stamp 22:55:33 for the previous approach and at 23:51:24 on the accident approach. The airplane’s stall speed when configured to land with full flaps, (Vso) is 65 KIAS. The Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) describes a minimum go around speed of 80 KIAS to ensure adequate airflow over the rudder to maintain its effectiveness during a go-around maneuver. It is likely that at the application of go-around power, the airspeed was inadequate to provide the right rudder pressure necessary to overcome the left turning yawing moment that was moving the airplane to the left.

Analysis

Primary failure mode
Loss of control
First missed decision gate
Pilot could have aborted the approach earlier to avoid loss of control.

NTSB coding

Evidence available

  • CVR
  • FDR / data
  • Photos
  • 13 docket documents
View NTSB final reportView NTSB docket

Docket documents13

Related mishaps