Pilot Debrief

CESSNA T206H near Idaho Falls, ID — 2015-09-21

Final reportWPR15IA263
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Date
2015-09-21
Location
Idaho Falls, ID, USA
Airport
IDA
Aircraft
CESSNA T206H
Registration
N7269T
Category
Airplane
Highest injury
Minor
Fatalities
0
Phase of flight
Initial climb

Probable cause

An in-flight fire during initial climb due to the separation of the engine's turbocharger wastegate overboard exhaust tailpipe. Contributing to the accident was the owner's decision to not comply with a service bulletin that addressed the tailpipe separation.

NTSB narrative

During initial climb and about 200 ft above ground level, the passenger observed smoke, which then rapidly filled the cabin. The pilot immediately turned the airplane toward the runway and subsequently performed a forced landing. Examination revealed that the airplane experienced an in-flight fire due to the separation of the engine's turbocharger wastegate overboard exhaust tailpipe from the turbocharger housing. The hot gases from the exhaust system subsequently burned through the battery's electrical cable insulation, which resulted in arcing, a short circuit, and fire. The airplane manufacturer had issued a service bulletin (SB) 16 years before the incident, which recommended installing a tailpipe lanyard to prevent the separation of the tailpipe. About 6 months before the incident, the airplane experienced a similar separation of the tailpipe. The damage was less severe, and it was limited to the battery and its electrical cables. After that event, the tailpipe clamp and gaskets were replaced, but the owner did not comply with the SB. No lanyard was found on the airplane, and no record was found indicating that the owner had complied with the SB at any time. However, the airplane was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91; therefore, compliance with the SB was not mandatory. Although complying with the SB was not mandatory for this airplane's operations, the owner should have complied with the SB to ensure the continued safe operation of the airplane.

Analysis

Primary failure mode
Mechanical failure
First missed decision gate
Compliance with service bulletin for tailpipe retention could have prevented the fire.

NTSB coding

  • Fire/smoke (non-impact) · Initial climb
  • Decision Making / Judgment
  • Maintenance

Evidence available

  • Photos
  • 4 docket documents
View NTSB final reportView NTSB docket

Docket documents4

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