Pilot Debrief

BELLANCA 7ACA near Bayport, MN — 2023-02-04

Final reportCEN23LA101
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Date
2023-02-04
Location
Bayport, MN, USA
Airport
21D
Aircraft
BELLANCA 7ACA
Registration
N9111L
Category
Airplane
Highest injury
Minor
Fatalities
0
Phase of flight
Approach

Probable cause

The pilot’s poor inflight fuel monitoring that resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation.

NTSB narrative

The pilot reported that before departure he checked the fuel level in the wing fuel tanks with a dip stick and the level correlated to about 24 gallons of fuel. After departure, he flew for about 3 hours. While approaching the destination airport, the engine started to run rough and then lost all power. The pilot executed a forced landing to a snow-covered field about 3 miles from the airport. The left wing collided with a tree during the forced landing and sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and wings during the impact. A postaccident examination found that the left-wing fuel cap was missing and the fuel tank was void of fuel; however, there was no evidence of fuel leaking from the left fuel tank nor was there fuel evidence on the ground or in the snow. The fuel tank was not compromised. The fuel cap was not located during a search of the accident site or of the fueling location; however, it is most likely that the fuel cap separated during the impact with the tree. During recovery of the airplane, when the right wing was cut at the root, a fire ignited and consumed a portion of the right wing and investigators were unable to determine the amount of fuel in the right wing. A detailed engine and airframe examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The accident flight departed with ample fuel for the flight. Given the empty left fuel tank and the lack of evidence to support a fuel leak, it is most likely that the engine lost power due to fuel starvation. During the accident sequence the seatbelt failed with a separation of the threading at the “Y” junction. The date of manufacturing stamp on the shoulder harness restraint was December 15, 2017. The shoulder harness label stated that the restraint system was an FAA-PMA part with a rated strength assembly of 1,500 pounds.

Analysis

Primary failure mode
Fuel management
First missed decision gate
Pilot could have verified fuel cap was secure before departure.

NTSB coding

Evidence available

  • Photos
  • 8 docket documents
View NTSB final reportView NTSB docket

Docket documents8

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