Pilot Debrief

BEECH 35 B33 near El Dorado, AR — 2015-08-23

Final reportCEN15FA374
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Date
2015-08-23
Location
El Dorado, AR, USA
Airport
ELD
Aircraft
BEECH 35 B33
Registration
N9704Y
Category
Airplane
Highest injury
Fatal
Fatalities
1
Phase of flight
Approach

Probable cause

The loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined during postaccident examination of the accident site or based on the available information and the pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed and his exceedance of the airplane's critical angle-of-attack after the engine power loss, which led to an aerodynamic stall and loss of control.

NTSB narrative

The private pilot was conducting a cross-country flight and had departed about 5.5 hours before the accident. The pilot originally filed a flight plan that covered 689 nautical miles (nm); however, he had to divert because of weather, so he changed his destination airport. When he neared the destination, he was cleared for the RNAV/GPS runway 4 approach and reported that he had the airport in sight. The total distance traveled was 722 nm. A witness stated that the pilot reported that he intended to circle for an approach to runway 31 and that he saw the airplane circling south of the airport. Shortly thereafter, the airplane impacted trees and terrain in an inverted, nose-down attitude, and the airplane's cabin was almost completely consumed by a postimpact fire. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, the propeller and propeller spinner damage was consistent with no engine rotation during the impact. The airplane was equipped with two fuel tanks, one in each wing, and a fuel selector with positions for selecting the left or right fuel tank with an additional position for turning off the fuel flow. There was no position available for drawing fuel from both tanks simultaneously. The fuel selector valve was not observed, and the determination of which tank was selected could not be determined. Although the departure fuel quantity could not be determined, calculations indicated that, if the airplane had full fuel tanks at the time of departure, it would have had an endurance of about 6.5 hours with an additional 45 minutes reserve fuel capacity at a reduced power setting. It could not be determined how much fuel was onboard the airplane at the time of the impact. A weather system was approaching the airport at the time of the accident, and lightning was recorded in the distance. It is possible that the pilot became distracted during the instrument approach by the approaching weather system and may not have selected the fullest fuel tank for the approach. This could have led to fuel starvation and a loss of engine power while he was maneuvering to land. Because the quantity of fuel before takeoff or the quantity remaining in each fuel tank at the accident site could not be determined, a loss of power due to fuel exhaustion could not be ruled out. Based on the available evidence, the engine lost power for a reason that could not be determined. Subsequently, the pilot likely attempted to extend the airplane's glide to reach the runway and exceeded its critical angle-of-attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control.

Analysis

Primary failure mode
Fuel management
First missed decision gate
Pilot could have ensured adequate fuel before changing destination to ELD.

NTSB coding

Evidence available

  • ADS-B / radar
  • Photos
  • 13 docket documents
View NTSB final reportView NTSB docket

Docket documents13

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